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"CONCERNING CHANGE": THE 
ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF 
RIGHTS ACT 1990 
K J Keith* 
This article draws on a paper delivered by the author, a Judge of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal, to the 10th Anniversary International Conference of the Society for the Reform of Criminal 
Law, London, 27 July – 1 August 1997.  In it, the author comments on the process leading to the 
enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and its implementation.  The origins and 
basic characteristics of the Act are discussed, and the impact of the Act on the preparation of 
legislation is explored.  The author then considers the impact of the Act on the Courts and raises 
some important issues and questions regarding the future of the Act. 
A little over 25 years ago, Professor John Roberts gave the last of the K J Scott Memorial 
Lectures.  In this tribute to him and his memory, I borrow his title, "Concerning Change",1 
in commenting on the process leading to the enactment of the Bill of Rights and on its 
implementation.  The subject matter more or less chooses itself.  It has been addressed by 
members of the political science department and the law faculty from at least the early 
1960s when I first enjoyed the privilege of having John Roberts as a colleague and a friend.  
They have addressed the issues both while still at the University and after – in submissions 
  
*  Judge of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Professor Emeritus of Victoria University of 
Wellington and member of the Law Faculty 1962-1964, 1966-1991.  This article draws on a paper 
delivered to the 10th Anniversary International Conference of the Society for the Reform of 
Criminal Law, London 27 July – 1 August 1997.  I am grateful to Jonathan Boston, Andrew Butler, 
Ellen France, Janet McLean and Mike Taggart for comments on an earlier draft and to Nicola 
Grant for her assistance in updating the paper. 
1  J L Roberts "K J Scott Memorial Lecture 1973: Concerning Change" (1974) 37 (1) NZJPA 1.  For 
tributes to John and some of his writing, see Margaret Clark (ed) The Roberts Report (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1999). 
 
722 (2000) 31 VUWLR 
to Parliament,2 as scholars,3 as advisers to government,4 as the Minister responsible for a 
Bill, as counsel and as judges.  As well, some of them have changed their position from 
opposition to support as has Parliament.5   
I consider (1) the immediate origins of the Bill of Rights, (2) some of its basic 
characteristics, (3) its impact on the preparation of legislation, and (4) its impact in the 
Courts.  I conclude with some lessons this brief account may suggest. 
I THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS  
In the 1984 electoral campaign the New Zealand Labour Party, then in opposition, 
emphasised constitutional reform.  After being elected to office, and while making huge 
changes in economic and social policy, it introduced extensive constitutional reform - in 
the structure of the state (with corporatisation, privatisation, state sector reform and public 
  
2  See the submissions, all against the Bill proposed in 1963 (a Bill which closely followed the 
Canadian Bill of Rights 1960), made by Professor R H Brookes and Dr A D Robinson of the 
Political Science Department, and Professor I D Campbell, Professor C C Aikman (for the 
Wellington District Law Society) and D L Mathieson and the writer, of the Law Faculty.  The 
Solicitor-General, H R C Wild QC, also expressed his opposition:  "This Bill is not only 
unnecessary:  its enactment would be positively against the public interest".  He mentioned that 
very senior Canadian judges were emphatic in advising against it.  "Most recently the Lord Chief 
Justice of England [Lord Parker] voluntarily raised the matter with me and expressed the fervent 
hope we would take the matter no further".  [1965] AJHR 8, 27, 29, 38 and 52.  Those submissions 
are reprinted in L Cleveland and A D Robinson Readings in New Zealand Government (1972).  
United Kingdom opinion has also changed as appears especially from the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 to give effect to the European Convention on Human Rights, a change 
generally and strongly supported by senior judges, including successive Chief Justices. 
3  The writing can be divided into three periods:  (1) the 1960s (relating to the proposals of that 
time), (2) the 1970s-1980s (especially writing relating to the 1985 proposal) and (3) from 1990 when 
the Bill was enacted.  For a very selective list see for example  (1) R G Mulgan, R Q Quentin-Baxter 
and G W R Palmer in K Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, Wellington, 1968) 
marking the 20th  anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the first and second 
papers focus more on the international texts);  (2) K Keith "A Lawyer Looks at Parliament" in Sir 
John Marshall (ed) The Reform of Parliament: Papers Presented in Memory of Dr Alan Robinson (1978);  
G Palmer Unbridled Power (1 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1979);  (3) A Butler and A 
Shaw "Arbitrary Arrest and Detention under the New Zealand Bill of Rights - the New Zealand 
Courts Stumble in Applying the International Covenant" [1993] NZLJ 139. 
4  Including Professor Peter Hogg OC QC, a former member of the Law Faculty, who was able to 
draw on his unparalleled Canadian experience, for example Constitutional Law of Canada (four 
editions between 1977 and 1997) and n 10 below.  In addition to the White Paper and many 
speeches by Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer as the responsible Minister, see  K Keith "A Bill of Rights for 
New Zealand?  Judicial Review versus Democracy" (1985) 11 NZULR 307. 
5  Compare Palmer's 1968 article with his 1979 book and the submissions made by Mathieson and 
me with my 1976 and 1985 papers. 
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finance reform),6 open government (with liberalising amendments to the Official 
Information Act 1982 and its extension to local government), the operation of Parliament 
(with major changes in standing orders and the select committee system), control over 
regulation making, the historical claims and constitutional status of Maori, proportional 
representation and, of course, the introduction of a Bill of Rights. 
Some of the immediate reasons for the changes were peculiar to New Zealand.  They 
included the extremes of economic regulation to which the country was subject in the 
period leading up to the election, the economic difficulties the government faced the day 
after the election and the relative lack of formal constraints within our constitutional 
system (and the growing concern about that lack), as well as the opinions and actions of 
individuals within the Labour Party itself, notably Geoffrey Palmer who was to become 
deputy Prime Minister, Attorney-General, Minister of Justice and Leader of the House for 
most of the six years of the Labour government.7  But other reasons for the reforms were, 
and are, more general and more enduring, including changes in the role of the state 
resulting from amazing technological and scientific development, ideological change and 
growing globalisation.8 
In the human rights area, the reasons for reform focused on the virtually unlimited 
powers of Parliament and the government, especially in a parliamentary system of 
government, the extensive role of the state, the limited controls on the exercise of 
parliamentary and governmental powers, the danger of erosion of human rights, the 
danger of waiting (an insurance policy cannot be bought after the house has been burned 
down), the enhancing of accountable and democratic government, the implementation of 
New Zealand's international obligations and the example of others.  Another particular 
  
6  For example John Roberts Politicians, Public Servants and Public Enterprise (Victoria University 
Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1987). 
7  In the second edition of his book Unbridled Power (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) 
he includes the Labour Party policy on these matters. The first edition was published on the day 
in 1979 when he received the nomination for a Parliamentary seat and began his move from the 
law faculty of the Victoria University of Wellington to Parliament.  The latest edition, co-authored 
by his son Dr Matthew Palmer (also a graduate and former law faculty member at Victoria 
University of Wellington), was published in 1997 under a new title, Bridled Power, which reflects 
something of the results of Sir Geoffrey's work. 
8  For an excellent book on those themes see Susan Strange The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of 
Power in the World Economy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996).  I have addressed 
some of the legal issues in "Sovereignty: A Legal Perspective" in G A Wood and L S Leland Jr 
(eds) State and Sovereignty: Is the State in Retreat? (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1997). 
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reason related to the constitutional recognition and affirmation of the rights of Maori 
under the Treaty of Waitangi.9  
I begin with the example of others since in the end the principal text for those who 
worked on the 1985 proposals was the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982.  
The rights included in that initial proposal closely matched those in the Canadian model 
(with some important exceptions),10 the drafting was similar and the Bill was to be 
entrenched.  As the Long Title to the Bill as enacted makes clear, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also played a significant role in the preparation of 
the text, although there are differences in scope and drafting between the Covenant and 
the Bill as it was finally enacted. 
The entrenchment provision would have prevented the repeal of, or amendment to, 
any provision of the Bill of Rights unless the proposal (1) had been passed by a majority of 
75 per cent of all the members of the House of Representatives, or (2) had been carried by a 
referendum of the electorate.  That formula was based on the provision included in New 
Zealand's electoral law since 1956 to protect certain core features of the electoral system 
but with the notable difference that it also purported to protect itself.  By contrast the 
entrenching provision in the 1956 and 1993 Electoral Acts could apparently be repealed 
first and the no longer protected provisions could then be repealed, in both cases by an 
ordinary simple majority vote.  Even if that may be so as a matter of law, convention 
strongly supports the protection.11  
  
9  This paragraph repeats headings from the chapter headed “Why Does New Zealand need a Bill of 
Rights?” in A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - a White Paper [1985] AJHR A5 [White Paper]. 
10  The New Zealand Bill does not include the broad right not to be deprived of liberty except in 
accordance with principles of fundamental justice included in s 7 of the Canadian Charter 
(compare s 8 of the New Zealand Bill) nor the general equality guarantees of s 15 (compare s 19).  
This narrowing, on which Professor Peter Hogg gave valuable advice, was part of an attempt to 
give the Bill a process emphasis and to lessen the prospect of the courts entering into substantive 
due process issues;  see for example paras 4.13-18 of the White Paper above n 9, and my 1985 
article, above n 4.  For a valuable related criticism of the inclusion of due process and equal 
protection provisions in an entrenched Bill of Rights see Frank Brennan "Thirty Years on, do we 
need a Bill of Rights?" (1996) 18 Adelaide LR 123.  On equality and non-discrimination see the 
differences of view expressed in Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA). 
11  The Royal Commission on the Electoral System in 1986 expressed the opinion, on the basis of 
principle and practice over the preceding 30 years, that the entrenchment now had conventional 
protection, Royal Commission on the Electoral System Towards a Better Democracy (Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1986) 288.  The parliamentary and popular referendum process followed in 
1992 and 1993 consolidates the convention;  see especially the important statement made by the 
Attorney-General, Paul East, (3 August 1993) 537 NZPD 17140;  see also the Introduction to the 
Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, Wellington, August 1996) 8. 
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The commentary to the proposed Bill of Rights made clear the government's opinion 
that such an entrenched constitutional status could be achieved both in law and as a matter 
of convention only if there was clear public support for that step:12 
A statute of this nature is of such major significance that there needs to be a general consensus 
amongst the public, both that it is needed and on its content.  If this consensus exists, it is far 
more likely that the courts will rule in favour of effective entrenchment of a Bill of Rights.  
The White Paper elaborated on the legal and conventional arguments:13 
One thing must be clearly understood.  To protect a Bill of Rights by entrenchment is not an 
attempt to write our contemporary political and constitutional understandings indelibly on the 
future.  That would display a foolish arrogance that assumes that what we regard as wisdom 
will hold true for all future generations.  History demonstrates quite clearly the falseness of 
that assumption.  To be sure the Bill of Rights is meant to be durable and it should not be easy 
to change it.  To obtain the proposed majority of members of Parliament will normally involve 
some sort of agreement between the major political parties.  Nor in the usual course will it be 
easy to obtain the support of the majority of electors in a referendum.  All this reflects, 
however, what the proposed Bill of Rights seeks to do.  It seeks to enshrine basic rights and 
freedoms, those things which the great majority of people in our present society see as 
fundamental.  They represent the common understandings of society in this context.  Clear 
support from the public will be essential if the Bill of Rights is to succeed.  By the same 
measure, if it is sought to change those understandings, then those changes too should only be 
made if there is a similar measure of support in society.   
The process followed over the next five years showed beyond any possible doubt that 
clear public support did not exist for an entrenched Bill.  The Select Committee which 
considered many submissions made in hearings held around the country reported that fact 
in 1988 and proposed by a majority that the Bill take the form simply of an interpretative 
statement, with the opposition (National) members of the Select Committee being opposed 
even to that lesser course.  A principal reason for the opposition to an entrenched Bill of 
Rights was that the Bill would give power to a non-elected, non-accountable and non-
representative judiciary.14  In the earlier debate in the 1960s members of the law faculty 
  
12  New Zealand Bill of Rights Bill 1990, para 7.19. 
13  White Paper above n 9, para 7.20. 
14  For a valuable account of the process see Paul Rishworth in P Rishworth and G Huscroft (eds) 
Rights and Freedoms: the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 
(Brookers, Wellington, 1995) ch 1. I recommend the book as a whole for its thorough examination 
of the Bill of Rights and also the Human Rights Act 1993.  Sir Geoffrey Palmer provides a most 
interesting inside account in New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis (McIndoe, Dunedin, 1992) ch 3. 
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and political science department consistently made that argument but it appears that in the 
1980s no one from that faculty and department repeated it. 
The dropping of superior law status was one of two major changes to the 1985 proposal 
which reduced the force and significance of the Bill.  The other was the removal of the 
provisions recognising and affirming the rights of the Maori people under the Treaty of 
Waitangi.  The government persevered with the reduced measure, introducing it as a Bill 
in October 1989.  It received its third reading ten months later and came into force on 
25 September 1990, shortly before the government which had shepherded it through was 
swept from office at the polls at the end of 1990. 
There was some initial question about the attitude of the new government to the new 
Bill, given its opposition to the proposals, both in the entrenched and interpretative forms.  
That opposition was in somewhat contradictory terms: either the Bill was a Trojan horse 
for a later entrenched Bill or it was a "Clayton's" Bill - the Bill of Rights you have when you 
are not having a Bill, a reference to a non-alcoholic "hard liquor" which soon disappeared 
from the shelves of New Zealand supermarkets.  
Unlike that ill-fated drink, the Bill certainly has not disappeared: according to one 
computer count there are 2,636 references to it in judgments delivered by the Court of 
Appeal in just the ten years since it came into force.  As I shall mention, the Bill has also 
had a real impact on the process for the preparation of legislation. That is to say the change 
in the status of the Bill between its 1985 and 1990 versions has not in my view emasculated 
it, as some contemporary opinion predicted.15  
  
15  See the views assembled by Rishworth, above n 14, 23-25.  Some similar later opinion is suggested 
by the words of the title of one critic, Hart Schwartz "The Short Happy Life and Tragic Death of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights" [1998] NZ Law Rev 295.  The following nine Court of Appeal 
judgments given since the article was completed might suggest the obituary was early: Lewis v 
Wilson & Horton Ltd (29 August 2000) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA131/00 (order quashing 
name suppression upheld because there were no grounds which could justify departing from the 
principle of open justice and the freedom to receive and impart information protected by s 14);  
Dunlea v Attorney-General (14 June 2000) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA306/98 (awards of 
damages for breaches of the unreasonable search provision of s 21 and the arbitrary detention 
provision of s 22 upheld in part);  Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 
(Board directed to consider censorship classification of a book and photographs on the basis that 
the Bill of Rights had not been given proper consideration);  R v Taliau (30 June 1999) unreported, 
Court of Appeal, CA99/99 (new trial ordered, in part for breach of appellant’s right to silence 
under s 23(1)(b);  Choudry v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 582 (CA) (the search and seizure 
provision of s 21 was invoked in support of the conclusion that the Security Intelligence Service 
had no implied power of entry in support of its power to intercept communications);  TV3 
Network Service v Fahey [1999] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) (the guarantee of freedom of speech in s 14 
supported the proposition that the jurisdiction to issue an interim injunction against a proposed 
broadcast should be exercised only for clear and compelling reasons);  Attorney-General v Upton 
(1998) 5 HRNZ 54 (compensation award, (1998) 3 HRNZ 179, for breach of right to a fair hearing 
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II SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
The general explanation of the effect of the Bill, as with other law, depends partly on its 
terms and partly on the use that those to whom it is directed make of it.  I consider those 
two matters briefly in this part of the paper and in more detail in the following two parts.  
The principal operative provisions of the Bill of Rights are to be found in sections 2 to 7 
(see also sections 28 and 29).  The Bill affirms the rights and freedoms it sets out (section 2) 
and applies only to public acts (section 3).  The rights and freedoms are not necessarily 
absolute since they may be subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, but only to such limits (section 5).  
So far the Bill follows the 1982 Canadian model but, in sharp distinction to that measure 
and the 1985 proposal, it does not provide that any law inconsistent with the Bill is of no 
effect (section 51(1) of the Canadian Charter and article 1 of the 1985 New Zealand draft 
Bill).  To the contrary, the strongest direction to the courts is that given in section 6: a 
meaning of an enactment consistent with the Bill is to be given if possible.  
Any doubt about the maintenance of the powers of future parliaments is removed by 
section 4 which was added to the Bill in the course of its progress through Parliament to 
emphasise the relative positions of legislature and court and the subordinate role of the Bill 
of Rights:  
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Bill of Rights),⎯ 
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any 
way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment⎯ 
                                                                                                                                                                 
on sentencing upheld);  De Montalk v R (25 June 1998) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA66/98 
(new trial ordered for breach of rights to legal representation);  Dane v R (25 June 1998) 
unreported, Court of Appeal, CA195/98 (name suppression refused, s 14 regulating right to 
impart information).  In the following six cases decided by the Court of Appeal in the year before 
the article was completed the Bill appears to have been significant:  Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 
NZLR 424 (s 14 a factor determining scope of freedom of speech in a political defamation case;  
see also Lange v Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC) and Lange v Atkinson (21 June 2000) unreported, 
Court of Appeal, CA52/97), Anderson v R (26 November 1997) unreported, Court of Appeal, 
CA366/97 (speculative search in breach of s 21 and evidence held inadmissible), R v J [1998] 1 
NZLR 20 (breach of fair hearing requirement of s 25(a);  conviction quashed), Fulcher v Attorney-
General (1997) 15 CRNZ 222 (principles underlying prohibition on retrospective criminal laws in s 
24(5) invoked in dissent),  R v Hines [1997] 3 NZLR 529 (fair trial rights preclude anonymous 
witnesses), Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 590 (s 14 supporting freedom of 
speech in defamation case). 
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by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights. 
Different views have been expressed about the relationship between sections 6, 5 and 
4.16  Is it the case that a judge in deciding whether a provision can be interpreted 
consistently with the rights affirmed in the Bill of Rights must also take into account the 
justified limitation provision in section 5?  As will appear, Attorneys-General in the 
exercise of their functions under section 7 have taken and do take account of section 5.  
One consideration bearing on this matter is that in some circumstances, if not in all, the 
difference between determining whether the right looked at alone has been breached and 
the right read with section 5 has been breached may be more one of emphasis than 
substance.  Consider, for instance, the determination of whether a particular statutory 
power is an exercise of a power of search or seizure or whether it is or is not unreasonable 
or whether it might or might not be held to be a reasonable limit justified in a free and 
democratic society.17   
A final point to be made about the operative provisions is that section 4, the provision 
asserting the continuing law-making authority of Parliament, notwithstanding the Bill of 
Rights, has according to the Law Reports rarely been invoked successfully.  One clear 
situation does however show it having the effect intended by those who inserted it.  The 
Bill of Rights provides that a person charged with an offence has the right to the benefit of 
a trial by jury when the penalty for the offence includes imprisonment for more than three 
months (with an exception for military trials).  At least two statutory provisions which 
provide for a penalty of six months deny the right to a jury trial.  High Court judges have 
held that those exclusions override the Bill's right to jury trial.18 
The remaining principal operative provision of the Bill, also added to the 1985 text (in 
this case before the Bill was introduced), is section 7 which requires the Attorney-General 
to report to Parliament on Bills appearing to breach the Bill of Rights.  That duty is 
considered in the next part of this paper.  
So much for a brief reference to the operative terms of the measure.  What of the 
attitudes of those to whom it was directed?  How have they used it?  Again those questions 
  
16  See for example Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) [Noort];  Moonen v Film and 
Literature Board of Review above n 15 and Rishworth, above n 14, ch 3. 
17  See also the discussions of s 5 in the judgments in the High Court and the Court of Appeal in 
Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22, 45 (HC) and [1998] 3 NZLR 424, 465-466 (CA) (linking back to 
the international material). 
18   Birch v Ministry of Transport (1992) 9 CRNZ 83 (HC), followed by Reille v Police [1993] 1 NZLR 587 
(HC).  The rarity of such cases might be explained in significant part by the very existence of s 4. 
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are considered in particular contexts in the next two parts of the paper, but some general 
comments may be useful.  
The first relates to the professional and public understanding of the possible and actual 
role of the law and in particular of courts in the control of state power.  That 
understanding has altered over recent decades in New Zealand as elsewhere in the 
common law world in the direction of greater control.  Consider the growth of judicial 
review of administrative action over the last 40 years, along with related legislation 
concerned, for instance, with the Ombudsman, freedom of information and the control of 
regulation making.  
The New Zealand legal profession, including government lawyers, the judiciary and 
the academics, have become more and more familiar with the issues of public power not 
simply as they arise locally but also elsewhere.  That understanding has increasingly taken 
account of international law as human rights treaties have been prepared within the 
United Nations system and regionally.  That international basis for the 1990 Act is made 
explicit in the title to the Bill of Rights :  
An Act 
... 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
It does, however, have to be said that the growth in New Zealand of the understanding 
of the role of international law in our national legal system has been slow and uneven.  We 
are not alone in that.  Judge Rosalyn Higgins, drawing on her extensive experience as 
counsel in domestic and international courts, as a member of the Human Rights 
Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
as an academic, has commented in a most interesting way on this matter.  While her 
comments appear in the course of a discussion of "the great jurisprudential debate" about 
the place of international law in national legal processes, she becomes more mundane 
when she refers to the "the reality of legal culture":19 
In some jurisdictions international law will be treated as a familiar topic, one that both the 
judge and the counsel before him will expect to deal with on a routine basis, the introduction 
of which occasions no special comment or interest.  Of course, this attitude is more to be 
expected in systems accepting the monist view.  But I speak of very practical matters: the judge 
  
19  Rosalyn Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1994) 206-207.  She focuses her comments by referring in a critical way to the differing 
cultures seen at various stages of the International Tin Council litigation in the English courts. 
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and lawyers in his court will have studied international law and will be familiar with it, just as 
they are familiar with other everyday branches of the law.  But there is another culture that 
exists, in which it is possible to become a practising lawyer without having studied 
international law, and indeed to become a judge knowing no international law.  
Psychologically that disposes both counsel and judge to treat international law as some exotic 
branch of the law, to be avoided if at all possible, and to be looked upon as if it is unreal, of no 
practical application in the real world.  Of course, this attitude is mostly to be found in those 
countries that embrace (in so far as they think about it at all) the dualist system.  It is a not 
unfair description of some courts in the United Kingdom.  But the lack of background in  
international law (which is why I speak of it as a legal culture, as much as a question of legal 
philosophy) manifests itself in various ways, for there are individual cultures as well as 
national cultures.  Some judges are simply rather contemptuous of everything to do with 
international law, which they doggedly regard as "unreal". Others are greatly impressed by 
international law, but feeling insufficiently familiar with it seek at all costs to avoid making 
determinations upon it: strenuous efforts are made not to decide points of international law, 
but to locate the ratio decidendi of the judgment on more familiar ground.  And yet others find 
international law potentially relevant and important and immerse themselves in it and are 
fully prepared to pronounce upon it. 
In New Zealand, the Law Commission became increasingly aware of the gap between 
the need for lawyers to know the international legal context in which they were operating 
and the reality of their knowledge and accordingly prepared A New Zealand Guide to 
International Law and its Sources.20 
With the Bill of Rights there was also the particular problem that many in the legal 
profession thought that the Bill had been abandoned by its sponsors.  It came into effect 
with almost no notice and to the extent that there was comment it was derisive.  This was 
in sharp contrast, for instance, to the major debates and educational processes that 
surrounded the coming into force of the Canadian Charter in 1982 and the United 
Kingdom Human Rights Act in 1998.  New Zealand in 1990 was in two senses to be 
compared not with Canada in 1982 but with Canada in 1960 when the Diefenbaker Bill of 
Rights was enacted - a non-entrenched measure enacted amidst considerable scepticism. 
But by 1990 in New Zealand important general changes in legal and judicial control 
over the administration and in expectations of the judicial role had occurred.  Also relevant 
were the efforts of a number of judges, academics, practitioners and lawyers within the 
law reform and policy processes, several of whom had undertaken postgraduate studies in 
  
20  New Zealand Law Commission R34 (NZLC, Wellington, 1996). 
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the United States.21  The attitudes reflected in those efforts may be seen as being among 
the reasons that the Bill now has a substantial impact.  It is interesting to compare, for 
instance, the flat opposition of Sir Richard Wild as Solicitor-General in 1963 to the proposal 
for a Bill of Rights at that time22 with the supportive attitudes of Sir Owen Woodhouse 
and Sir Robin Cooke, the Presidents of the Court of Appeal in the late 1970s and 1980s.23  
Judges in more recent times have also been assisted by extensive exchanges of information 
and experience within the Commonwealth, notably at the Judicial Colloquia organised by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat and Interights with the guiding hand of Lord Lester of 
Herne Hill QC.24  With other lawyers, some at least of the judges would also have been 
aware of the burgeoning literature around the Commonwealth.25 
III THE ROLE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE PREPARATION OF 
LEGISLATION 
The Minister of Justice, in his introduction to the White Paper on the Bill of Rights, 
indicated that he did not see the striking down of legislation as the major means for giving 
effect to the rights in it:26 
The draft Bill of Rights involves giving more power to the Courts.  Where any Act of 
Parliament, common law rule or official action is contrary to the Bill of Rights it can be 
declared invalid by a court.  This element of the Bill of Rights is the key change in New 
Zealand's constitutional law.  It is an important change but too much should not be made of it.  
Courts will only infrequently declare provisions in Acts of Parliament contrary to the Bill of 
Rights.  In practical terms the Bill of Rights is a most important set of messages to the 
machinery of Government itself.  It points to the fact that certain sorts of laws should not be 
passed, that certain actions should not be engaged in by Government.  In that way a Bill of 
Rights provides a set of navigation lights for the whole process of Government to observe. 
  
21  See for example K Keith "The Impact of American Ideas on New Zealand's Educational Policy, 
Practice and Theory: the Case of Law" (1988) 18 VUWLR 327. 
22  See his evidence to the Select Committee considering the 1963 Bill (based closely on the Canadian 
Bill of 1960), above n 2. 
23  For example A O Woodhouse Government under the Law (J C Beaglehole lecture 1979) and R B 
Cooke "Practicalities of a  Bill of Rights" (1984) 112 Council Brief 4, (1986) 2 Australian Bar Rev 
189, and W K Hastings (ed) F S Dethridge Memorial Addresses 1977-1988 (Maritime Law Association 
of Australia and New Zealand, Auckland, 1989) 71. 
24  The first and latest were held in Bangalore, India, in 1988 and 1998. For a brief account of that held 
in Georgetown, Guyana, in 1996, see Lester "The Georgetown Conclusions on the Effective 
Protection of Human Rights Through Law" [1996] Public Law 562.   
25  See for example that listed in the bibliography in the White Paper above n 9. 
26  White Paper above n 9. 
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And in the end I believe that will be the greatest contribution a Bill of Rights will make to 
improving our system of government. 
That pre-enactment role was given added emphasis in the Bill as introduced and 
enacted in 1990.  While the role of the courts was reduced by the superior law status of the 
Bill being replaced by an interpretative role, section 7, as already noted, was added to 
require the Attorney-General to assess all proposed Bills against the rights and freedoms in 
the Bill and, if a breach was identified, to report it to the House of Representatives.  There 
should, of course, be a substantial administrative process supporting those responsibilities 
of the first law officer.  The obligation is in the first place on Ministers proposing 
legislation and the officials advising them.  Under the Cabinet Office Manual a Minister in 
requesting the inclusion of the Bill in the legislative programme and then in proposing the 
Bill for introduction is to report on compliance with a number of matters, giving reasons if 
the Bill will not comply.  The list of matters includes the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and relevant international standards and obligations.27  The two may overlap and 
any breach of the Bill of Rights is likely also to be a breach of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  That is something to which both the Human Rights Committee 
set up under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Attorney-
General are sensitive.  In its comments on the most recent New Zealand periodic report the 
Committee has drawn particular attention to the Attorney-General's certificates 
under section 7.28  The parliamentary processes have also been strengthened by changes to 
standing orders requiring the Attorney-General to table in the House of Representatives a 
paper setting out the grounds for the opinion of inconsistency.29 
In 1991 the government established a procedure for the vetting of legislation by the 
Ministry of Justice and the Crown Law Office.30  Most of the material relevant to that 
process is not public; as well, the process itself, although the subject of some careful 
 
  
27  Cabinet Office Manual above n 11, 122, 124 and paras 5.26-29. 
28  Human Rights in New Zealand (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Information Bulletin 54, 
1995) 61-62 and 69-70. 
29  Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (1996) SO 258. 
30  Attorney-General "Memorandum:  Monitoring Bills for Compliance with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights 1990" in M Chen and G Palmer Public Law in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1993) 556. 
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criticism, has not been the subject of a public independent review.  But, as the following 
five instances indicate, enough of the process is public to provide useful instruction.31   
1 Bail legislation  
Between 1991 and 1993 the government was under pressure from within and without 
to strengthen the law relating to violent offending.  One area of controversy concerned the 
law of bail.  The Solicitor-General has reported that the proposals which were finally 
included in the Bill introduced into the House at the end of 1992 were moderated by 
reference to the right in section 22 of the Bill of Rights not to be arbitrarily detained.  We 
shall see (under (5) below) that one measure included in the resulting Act which received 
criticism from the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights appears to have escaped effective scrutiny in that executive process. 
2 Police questioning  
The second instance shows that it is not only within the executive that the Bill of Rights 
may influence and constrain the preparation of legislation.  The Law Commission, in 
preparing proposals in the difficult area of police powers of questioning, constantly tested 
them against the Bill of Rights.  The Ministerial reference to the Commission indeed set as 
a purpose conformity with the International Covenant.  The debate about the 
Commission's proposals, like litigation on the same matters, keeps returning to the rights 
as set out in the Bill and the related jurisprudence in New Zealand and abroad.32   
3 Traffic law: breath screening 
This is an instance of the operation of the Bill of Rights in parliamentary processes.  The 
Attorney-General reporting under section 7 considered that a proposed new power of 
random breath screening of drivers was in breach of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights 
  
31  The accounts are drawn from Grant Huscroft in Huscroft and Rishworth, above n 14, ch 4; P 
Rishworth "Human Rights and the Bill of Rights" [1996] NZ Law Rev 298, John McGrath QC "The 
Bill of Rights and the Legislative Process" in The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal 
Research Foundation, Auckland, 1992), Paul East QC in P A Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution 
(Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 189-195, and K Keith "Road Crashes and the Bill of Rights: A 
Response" [1994] NZ Recent Law Rev 115.  For related Canadian accounts see P Hogg and Bushell 
"The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures …" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75 and 
Janet L Hiebert "Why Must a Bill of Rights be a Contest of Political and Judicial Wills?  A 
Canadian Alternative" (1999) 10 PLR 22. One limit on the process is that it applies only when a Bill 
is introduced.  It does not extend to amendments made to Bills when they are in the House.  While 
that limit does not prevent Attorney-General statements in respect of such amendments, a recent 
decision suggests that the limit may have serious consequences;  R v Poumako (31 May 2000) 
unreported, Court of Appeal, CA565/99. 
32  New Zealand Law Commission Police Questioning R31 (NZLC, Wellington, 1994). 
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against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.  The legislation he 
criticised was however enacted unchanged.  Does this mean, as some have suggested, that 
the section 7 process failed?  I think that the opposite is the case.  The Attorney-General's 
position was directly challenged before the Select Committee which was in possession of 
information and arguments bearing on the very issues in question.  Did the law provide 
for search and seizure; if so was the proposed power of search and seizure unreasonable;  
even if it was, was the proposed law a limit imposed by law which was justified in a free 
and democratic society?  These matters are obviously capable of assessment by a Court but 
they can also be assessed in Parliament through the Select Committee process.  As it 
happened, that Select Committee had available to it more concrete information about the 
operation of such powers and a wider range of opinion than is disclosed in the judicial 
opinion which appeared at the time to be most in point, a judgment of the United States 
Supreme Court in which a similar law enacted in Michigan had been upheld. 
4 Classification of objectionable publications 
This example relating to a comprehensive rewriting of the New Zealand law on 
indecent publications, videos and films makes two points relating, first, to the danger of 
focusing on the Bill of Rights at the expense of other aspects of legal principle, and, second, 
to the international context in which human rights issues are increasingly to be seen.  The 
Attorney-General reported that a provision creating an offence of strict liability for 
possessing material held to be objectionable was in breach of the principle against the 
retrospective application of criminal law.  Again that opinion was challenged.  After all, 
criminal courts constantly make decisions, after the event, whether a particular action 
breached the relevant law.  It is indeed rare for them to rule in advance.  What the 
principle of non-retrospectivity requires is that the assessment be made by reference to the 
law in force at the time.  That principle was not challenged by the proposal.   
Rather, what was wrong with the proposed strict liability offence in terms of legal 
principle, in the minds of some critics, was that actions which were entirely without fault 
were to be made the subject of criminal sanction. That the Bill of Rights should not be 
treated as a comprehensive statement of legal principle against which legislative proposals 
are to be tested is made clear by the Cabinet Office Manual and the report, endorsed by that 
Manual, of the Legislation Advisory Committee, on Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process 
and Content (new edition 1991).   
In its comments on the most recent New Zealand periodic report under the Covenant, 
the Human Rights Committee questioned a different aspect of the Films, Videos and 
Publications Classification Act - its definition of objectionable material.  The Committee 
saw that definition as infringing freedom of speech.  Officials did in fact raise that issue 
with the Attorney-General but he did not report to the House on it, presumably 
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concluding that the definition did not breach the freedom of speech guarantee in section 14 
as read with the reasonable limits provision of section 5.33 
5 Preventive detention   
This last instance of the operation (or really the non-operation) of section 7 helps make 
the same point.  The 1993 criminal justice reform legislation mentioned earlier under the 
bail heading ((1) above) also widened the availability of the sentence of preventive 
detention.  Instead of requiring more than one offence as a prerequisite that law provided 
that in some circumstances the penalty could be imposed for a single very serious offence. 
When considering these provisions the Human Rights Committee expressed concern that 
the imposition of punishment in respect of future offences was inconsistent with articles 9 
and 14 of the Covenant.34 
The differences between the Human Rights Committee and Parliament in the two areas 
just mentioned relate to important issues of legal and social policy.  They highlight the 
internationalisation of those policy issues.  The national processes mentioned also 
demonstrate the important role a Bill of Rights can play in the advisory, executive and 
legislative processes and not simply in the courts.  Those processes can and have become 
more principled and reasoned.  They can and do focus better on the competing values and 
relevant facts.  To recall a point that has also arisen in the courts, it is clear from the reports 
of the Attorney-General that section 5, the justified limits provision, is part of that advisory 
process.  In that context, for instance, the Attorney and his or her advisers have made 
extensive use of an important early decision of the Canadian Supreme Court on the 
justified limits provision.35 
IV THE IMPACT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE COURTS 
The principal impact of the Bill of Rights in the courts, at least on a day to day basis, is 
in the area of criminal justice.  A consideration of some aspects of cases in that area can 
usefully be introduced by two passages in an early drink/driving case.36  Cooke P said 
this about "the approach to the Bill of Rights Act":37 
Part II of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act sets out the rights and freedoms affirmed by the 
Act.  The drafting is of the kind typical of declarations of human rights, described by 
  
33  See also Re New Truth and T V Extra (1996) 3 HRNZ 162, 176. 
34  See Human Rights in New Zealand above n 28, 69.  See also R v Leitch [1998] 1 NZLR 420, 431. 
35  R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.  They also refer to Noort above n 16. 
36  Noort above n 16. 
37  Noort above n 16, 268. 
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Lord Wilberforce giving the judgment of the Privy Council in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher 
[1980] A.C. 319, 328, as "a broad and ample style which lays down principles of width and 
generality". ... In the Fisher case, which concerned the Bermuda Constitution, Lord Wilberforce 
after referring to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms 
(1953) and the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) made the 
statement, now evidently destined for judicial immortality: 
These antecedents, and the form of Chapter I itself, call for a generous interpretation 
avoiding what has been called "the austerity of tabulated legalism," suitable to give to 
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.   
Richardson J, like Cooke P, quoted the title to the Act and then continued:38 
Three points may be noted.  First "affirm", "protect" and "promote" are all words expressive of 
a positive commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms.  It is in that spirit that 
interpretation questions are to be resolved.  Second, the deliberate reference to "affirm" in the 
long title and in s 2 ... makes the very important point that the Act is declaratory of existing 
rights.  It does not create new human rights.  As basic human rights, the rights and freedoms 
referred to do not derive from the 1990 Act.  In that respect it parallels the Bill of Rights Act 
1689 which was declaratory of "the true, ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the 
people" (section 6).  That philosophical underpinning has to be taken into account when 
construing and applying the Bill of Rights Act provisions.  Third, para (b) of the long title 
affirms New Zealand's commitment to internationally accepted human rights standards.  As 
recognised in the preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, human 
rights "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person" and States party to the 
Covenant are obliged "to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
freedoms".   
Next, any reading of the 1990 Act brings out its special characteristics.  Some have already 
been noticed.  Two more should be mentioned.  First the statement in Part II of civil and 
political rights is in broad and simple language.  No doubt that is to emphasise the importance 
which Parliament attaches to their clear expression.  It calls for a generous interpretation 
suitable to give individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred 
to (Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 328).   
The second is the recognition of limitations on the absoluteness and generality of the rights 
and freedoms affirmed in the Act.  This reflects the fundamental consideration that individual 
freedoms are necessarily limited by membership of society and by duties to other individuals 
and to the community.  That consideration is also reflected in the statement in the preamble to 
  
38  Noort above n 16, 277. 
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that an individual has "duties to other 
individuals and to the community to which he [or she] belongs".  
He then went on to quote sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act and under the heading 
"Interpretation of Bill of Rights Legislation" he said this:39 
To sum up at this point, the Bill of Rights Act is a legislative commitment to the protection and 
promise of those basic human rights and freedoms set out in the Bill.  Those rights are not 
absolute and that commitment does not preclude Parliament from abridging or even excluding 
their application.  Sections 5 and 6 reflect a strong legislative intention to protect the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights.  In determining under section 4 whether there is an 
inconsistency between the provisions of another enactment and a provision of the Bill of 
Rights, it is proper to have regard to the statutory objectives of protecting and promoting 
human rights in New Zealand, and New Zealand's commitment to international human rights 
standards, and also to the limiting provisions of section 5 and section 6.  In the end, and in the 
absence of an express statutory exclusion of a Bill of Rights provision, it must be a question of 
determining under section 4 whether there is any room for reading along with the other 
enactment a Bill of Rights provision whether absolute or modified or limited pursuant to 
sections 5 and 6.  
These statements by senior members of the Court of Appeal indicate early positive 
attitudes to the new measure.  There is none of the narrowness and caution that might 
perhaps have been expected had a similarly confined statute with a similarly difficult birth 
been enacted at some particular earlier times. 
Others can assess the record from a greater distance than I can.  Consistently with the 
courts' experience, this part of the paper mainly concerns criminal justice matters, but I 
begin with cases from two other areas – freedom of speech and the prohibition on 
discrimination.  They provide a reminder that the Bill is not simply about the rights of 
suspects and defendants in the criminal justice process.  They highlight as well a 
continuing fundamental issue of who decides what since the freedom of speech decision, 
Lange v Atkinson,40 has been criticised on the basis that the Court should have deferred to 
Parliament while the case on discrimination, Quilter v Attorney General,41 has produced the 
opposite complaint of undue deference to political processes.  Some might also see the 
latter case as involving a departure from the early attitude to the Bill but others might 
  
39  Noort above n 16, 278. 
40  Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 42 (CA);  see also [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC) and (21 June 2000) 
unreported, Court of Appeal, CA52/97. 
41  Quilter v Attorney General above n 10. 
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think the approach adopted by some of the judges as appropriate given the nature of the 
issues and the particular non-discrimination provision included in the Bill.42 
In the latter case three lesbian couples who wished to marry challenged refusals to 
issue marriage licences.  The Court was unanimous that same sex marriages were not 
provided for in the Marriage Act – with the consequence that any breach of rights under 
the Bill would be sanctioned by section 4.  The members of the Court nevertheless went 
ahead and considered the question whether the Bill's prohibition on discrimination was 
breached. They divided.  Their different approaches can be related to different views of the 
relative roles of judge and legislator in developing the law in such areas and, more 
concretely, raise the question whether the judicial developments are to be by way of the 
particular incidents or consequences of status or by altering the status itself.  The 
judgments may also be assessed in terms of the sources on which they draw – including 
legislation, judicial decisions, scholarly writings and international texts.  Some of the 
apparent or even actual certainties that once arose from more confined sources of law and 
argument have gone.  That change is not simply a change in practice, relating to the greater 
accessibility of burgeoning sources.  It is a consequence or aspect of what an outstanding 
English academic lawyer has recently identified as the challenges to the law presented by a 
flat, secular, plural, sophisticated democracy.  "Our law lives in a new world.  It has 
burdens which it never bore before, in the simple hierarchical society of the years, and 
centuries, before the war."43 
A similarly wide range of sources is also to be seen in the political defamation case.  
They extend to the literary with Areopagitica and to political philosophy with John Stuart 
Mill.  In that case a unanimous court held that the defence of qualified privilege could 
protect the maker of certain statements about those engaged in parliamentary politics.  The 
relevant principles – which might have wider application – build on broad common law 
conceptions, on the nature of our democratic constitution and on freedom of expression as 
demonstrated in a range of situations in New Zealand and elsewhere – as well as on the 
right to reputation.  The court answered negatively the question whether it should leave 
the issue to Parliament, noting among other things that Parliament had for at least two 
centuries essentially left the matter to judicial clarification, application and development. 
Many of the cases in the criminal justice area concern police powers of search and 
seizure.  A 1996 judgment of the Court of Appeal brought together, on the basis of 25 cases 
decided in that court in the previous six years, a list of relevant principles and 
  
42  See the discussion in P Rishworth "Reflections on the Bill of Rights after Quilter v Attorney-General" 
[1998] NZ Law Rev 683. 
43  Peter Birks "The Academic and the Practitioner" (1998) 19 Legal Studies 397, 402. 
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considerations.44  One reason for that course was to reduce the uncertainty arising from 
that range of decisions.  The tenth item in the list reads: 
The Bill of Rights is not a technical document.  It has to be applied in our society in a realistic 
way.  The application and interpretation of the Bill must also be true to its purposes as set out 
in its title of affirming, protecting and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
New Zealand, and affirming New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  The crucial question is whether what was done constituted an 
unreasonable search or seizure in the particular circumstances. Anyone complaining of a 
breach must invest the complaint with an air of reality and must lay a foundation for the 
complaint before the trial court by explicit challenge or cross-examination or evidence. 
That proposition refers both to the international context of the Bill of Rights and to its 
requirement of realistic assessments.  Such elements also appear in propositions (5) and (6): 
5.  A prime purpose of section 21 [stating the right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure] is to ensure that governmental power is not exercised unreasonably.  A section 21 
inquiry is an exercise in balancing legitimate state interests against any intrusions on 
individual interests.  It requires weighing relevant values and public interests. 
6. The guarantee under section 21 to be free from unreasonable search and seizure reflects 
an amalgam of values.  A search of premises is an invasion of property rights and an intrusion 
on privacy.  It may also involve a restraint on individual liberty and an affront to dignity.  Any 
search is a significant invasion of individual freedom.  How significant it is will depend on the 
circumstances.  There may be other values and interests, including law enforcement 
considerations, which weigh in the particular case. 
Contemporary society attaches a high value to privacy and to the security of personal privacy 
against arbitrary intrusions by those in authority.  Privacy values underlying the section 21 
guarantee are those held by the community at large.  They are not merely the subjective 
expectations of privacy which a particular owner or occupier may have and may demonstrate 
by signs or barricades. 
Reasonable expectations of privacy are lower in public places than on private property.  They 
are higher for the home than for the surrounding land, for farm land and for land not used for 
residential purposes.  And the nature of the activities carried on, particularly if involving 
public engagement or governmental oversight, may affect reasonable expectations of privacy.  
An assessment of the seriousness of the particular intrusion involves considerations of fact and 
  
44  R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA); the Privy Council refused leave to appeal.  For 
critical comment see A Butler "The End of Principle and Precedent in Bill of Rights Cases?" [1997] 
NZ Law Rev 274 and Schwartz, above n 15. 
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degree, not taking absolutist stances.  In that regard, and unlike the thrust of the American 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the object of section 21 is vindication of individual rights 
rather than deterrence and disciplining of police misconduct. 
A second major area of dispute has been police questioning.  One early matter of 
difficulty was the temporal one.  At what point does a person fall within the language 
"who is arrested or who is detained under any enactment"?45  It is at that point that a 
suspect becomes entitled to certain rights, especially to be informed of the reason for the 
arrest or detention, to have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and to 
be informed of that right, and to have the right to refrain from making any statement and 
to be informed of that right.  The Law Commission has proposed that Parliament spell out 
police powers of questioning in more detail.  Practical questions also arise about support 
for the rights, especially through legal aid. 
The right to an early trial has presented a third set of challenges to the courts and to the 
courts' administration.  The Court of Appeal in Martin v Tauranga District Court46 gave 
substance to the right by stopping a prosecution which it considered had taken too long to 
get to trial.  Again this right, as stated in the Bill of Rights, can be seen as long existing in 
the common law as well as being recognised in international law.  One practical 
consequence of the case has been to focus the attention of the new Department for Courts 
and others responsible on the need to ensure that facilities and judges are available to 
ensure that criminal prosecutions proceed promptly.   
A fourth area of contention has concerned the media and criminal trials in contempt 
proceedings and in access to court records.  In a 1996 judgment, concerning access to 
evidence which had been held inadmissible in a major murder trial, the Court of Appeal in 
ordering the release of the information called not only on the provision of the Bill of Rights 
about public hearings but also on the relevant provisions of the International Covenant 
and on judicial statements of the values underlying freedom of speech.47    
A final matter of major difficulty concerns the consequences of breach.  In Grayson and 
Taylor, the Court of Appeal indicated that on an appropriate occasion it would be prepared 
to re-examine the prima facie exclusion rule for evidence obtained in breach of the Bill of 
Rights.  As the Court says, one remedy available for violations of the Bill of Rights is 
monetary damages or compensation.  In a wide range of possible cases damages will be 
available in terms of the regular tort liability of the public agencies involved for trespass, 
  
45  See for example:  R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257; R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153 and 390. 
46  Martin v Tauranga District Court [1995] 2 NZLR 419 (CA). 
47  Television New Zealand Ltd v R [1996] 3 NZLR 393 (CA).  For a contempt of court decision, 
balancing the competing values, see Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General [1995] 3 NZLR 563. 
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assault or wrongful imprisonment.  But in some cases there may be no remedy in tort 
available either because of the area of law involved or because of an immunity or 
protection provision in the relevant legislation.  The Court of Appeal held in Baigent's 
Case48 that in such a situation monetary compensation was available for the breach of the 
Bill of Rights. 
In reaching the conclusion that a person whose rights under the Bill of Rights have 
been breached could seek compensation, four members of the Court drew on the text of 
the Bill (which is silent on the matter of remedies), established common law principle 
(where there is a right there is a remedy), relevant foreign case law, and New Zealand's 
international obligations.  As well, all members of the Court were also willing to use 
standard methods of statutory interpretation to read down immunity or protective 
provisions in legislation, to permit actions in trespass. 
More recently, members of the Court have addressed the question, amidst some 
controversy, whether the Court could and should make declarations of inconsistency in the 
event that a statutory provision cannot be reconciled with the statement of rights in the 
Bill.49 
V SOME LESSONS AND QUESTIONS 
Some of the lessons suggested by the story of the Bill of Rights over the last 30 or 40 
years are also to be seen in other major constitutional changes which have occurred over 
the same period and to which, as well, University colleagues50 contributed in a range of 
ways:  they include the development of the Office of the Ombudsman, reform of the state 
services early and later in the period, the National Development Conference and related 
processes, environmental policies, the place of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Official 
Information Act, control over regulation making, corporatisation and privatisation, the 
electoral system, law reform and treaty making processes. 
A first lesson, relating to the occasion for this essay, concerns the role of the academic 
as "critic and conscience of society" – to quote the 1990 university legislation.  I mention 
three aspects: the constructive critical role (for instance through submissions on legislation 
and law reform proposals and as members of advisory bodies, as well as through academic 
  
48  Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent's Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
49  Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review above n 15 and R v Poumoko above n 31. 
50  Naming names can be invidious but consider these members of related departments from the mid 
1960s to the mid 1970s: C C Aikman, R M Alley, G P Barton, J C Beaglehole, T H Beaglehole, R H 
Brookes, L V Castle, R S Clark, L Cleveland, F W Holmes, D L Mathieson, R G Mulgan, G W R 
Palmer, A B Quentin-Baxter, R Q Quentin-Baxter, I L M Richardson, A D Robinson, J L Robson, 
F L W Wood, as well as J L Roberts. 
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writing published in the journals and books);  empirical research (for instance about the 
practical impact of the Bill of Rights on police practice51 and on the preparation of 
legislation);  and, to adapt Mathew Arnold, the capacity to see a matter steadily and to see 
it whole.   
Other lessons are applications of that final aspect:  one is that the Bill of Rights and the 
related international texts are, of course, entwined with the common law and extensive 
statutory regimes.  This paper runs the risk, demonstrated by the controversy over the 
censorship legislation mentioned earlier, of isolating the Bill of Rights from other elements 
which have historically constituted our law.  As Lord Cooke said in 1986, much of what an 
entrenched Bill of Rights could accomplish was capable of being achieved by the common 
law already.  A wholly new power relationship between the courts and Parliament was 
probably unlikely.52  But the Bill undoubtedly gives greater emphasis to the rights it 
affirms.  So the former Solicitor-General, in a recent paper on contempt of court and the 
media, sees the Court of Appeal as rejecting any idea that the law of contempt can be seen 
as standing unaffected by or prevailing over the Bill of Rights.53  
Another aspect of making a broader assessment is to determine the significance of the 
decision made to have an interpretive rather than entrenched Bill by drawing on the 
experience not just of New Zealand but also of other countries:  an entrenched Bill of 
Rights might rarely result in statutes being struck down (as in the United States 
throughout the 19th century);  or statutes might be struck down relatively often (as with 
the Canadian Charter); or, if that does happen, the invalidation might frequently be 
reversed by constitutional amendment (as in Zimbabwe).  It might also be said that the  
 
  
51  As a consequence of the Bill of Rights are the guilty not being charged or are they being acquitted 
because of the rules and in what numbers?  How do we now see the Blackstonian dictum that it is 
better that 12 guilty people go free than one innocent is wrongly convicted?  One particular 
international acceptance of that possible consequence is highlighted in the Convention on Torture, 
article 15 of which provides that any statement which has been made as the result of torture may 
not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except of course against a person accused of 
torture.  For a recent consideration by the Privy Council see Mohammed v The State [1999] 2 WLR 
552. 
52  [1986] NZLJ 148. 
53  J McGrath "Contempt and the Media : Constitutional Safeguard or State Censorship?" [1998] NZ 
Law Rev 371, 383. 
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possible extent of interpretive approaches has yet to be fully tested, and that the United 
Kingdom's experience of its Human Rights Act 1998 will surely be instructive.54   
The question whether the Bill should be entrenched (as the Human Rights Committee 
set up under the ICCPR has suggested) sharpens issues about the use of courts to pursue 
political purposes - or rather their more extensive use in that way, for there are many 
instances of political cases in many jurisdictions down the centuries.55  As the perception 
of a court's political role is heightened, greater attention focuses on the judicial 
appointment process and matters of tenure.  Again there is much relevant foreign 
experience.56 
The external reference is of course not simply to other national courts, legislatures, law 
reform bodies and commentators.  Equally or more importantly it is to the relevant human 
rights treaties.  New Zealand courts refer to them and to the interpretation given to them 
in determining the meaning of related provisions of the Bill of Rights.  Those treaties relate 
as well to the entrenchment issue.  The powers of the New Zealand legislature, 
emphasised by section 4 of the Bill, may not be all that they appear given that very 
extensive body of international obligation.  To draw on earlier discussions, it can be said 
that when the Bill is seen in its international context we have a super Bill rather than a full 
or half-full Bill.57  Such a view gains support from the opinions of the Human Rights 
Committee and the United Nations Secretary-General expressed in the context of North 
Korea's purported withdrawal from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and of an Australian Attorney-General that States which are party to the two 
international covenants have no right of unilateral withdrawal from the obligations to 
  
54  For an early sign see R v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 3 WLR 175 (CA).  In his recent review 
of the first decade of operation of the Bill of Rights one commentator suggests that New Zealand’s 
unentrenched, interpretive Bill of Rights has been treated by the courts as a constitutionalised, 
entrenched Bill of Rights : J Allan “Turning Clark Kent into Superman : the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990” (2000) 9 Otago Law Review 613. 
55  See for example C Harlow and R Rawlings Pressure through Law (Routledge, London, 1992) and 
Keith "The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice" (1996) 17 Aust YBIL 39 
(referring to the early 17th century Case of Prohibitions, slavery cases in the 18th and 19th centuries 
and the then pending requests to the ICJ for advisory opinions about the lawfulness of the use of  
nuclear weapons). 
56  See for example Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand 
System Survive?" in B D Gray and R B McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance 
(Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 11.  Changes involving wider participation and greater transparency 
in the appointment processes have been made in the last year with the full support of the 
judiciary.  See The Report of the New Zealand Judiciary 1998 (Department for Courts, Wellington, 
1999). 
57  See for example K Keith "A Bill of Rights:  Does it Matter?  A Comment"  (1997) 32 Texas ILJ 393. 
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which they committed themselves.  No such right is expressly provided for as it is, for 
instance, in the European Convention on Human Rights; and, in accordance with the law 
declared in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it appears that no power of 
withdrawal could be implied.58   
The interaction between the various sources of law and influence and their constraining 
effect is demonstrated by Baigent's Case and its aftermath. The conclusion that as a matter 
of law there is a monetary remedy and that as a matter of policy there must be one is given 
added force by the comments of the Human Rights Committee on New Zealand's latest 
periodic report under the Covenant.  Indeed the Committee went further in proposing that 
the remedy should have statutory or even entrenched constitutional force.  Finally, the 
Law Commission, following a review requested by the government, has concluded, 
essentially for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal, but on the basis of much more 
extensive information, that the remedy should remain.59  Those interrelated processes help 
emphasise the stability of the Bill as also appears from the fact that the Bill has remained 
unchanged over the last decade, except for an amendment to the prohibition on 
discrimination to align it with the Human Rights Act 1993. 
The increasing internationalisation of much law-making extends far beyond human 
rights law.  About one third of all New Zealand public statutes give effect to or bear on 
international obligations binding on New Zealand.  In 1998 alone Parliament enacted the 
following statutes which give effect to treaties and other international agreements :  
• Accident Insurance Act (personal injury liability conventions and ILO 
conventions); 
• Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Act; 
• Appropriation statutes (memberships of international organisations); 
• Copyright (Removal of Prohibition on Parallel Importing) Amendment Act; 
• Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons and Hostages) Amendment Act (1994 
Convention on Safety of UN and Associated Personnel); 
• Customs and Excise Amendment Acts; 
• Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Amendment Act; 
  
58  (1995) 16 Aust YBIL 470-471 and G Palmer "Human Rights and the New Zealand Government's 
Treaty Obligations" (1999) 29 VUWLR 57, 64-65. 
59  New Zealand Law Commission Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity: A Response to Baigent's Case 
and Harvey v Derrick R37 (NZLC, Wellington, 1997). 
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• Extradition Amendment Act; 
• International Finance Agreements Amendment Act; 
• Land Transport Act (conventions on road transport); 
• Maritime Transport Amendment Act (pollution liability and tonnage convention); 
• Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act (1998 Vienna Convention on Psychotropic 
Drugs); 
• Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Amendment Act (protection and drugs 
conventions); 
• Postal Services Act (Universal Postal Union and Asia Pacific Postal Union); 
• Trade in Endangered Species Amendment Act. 
One consequence of the increasing recognition that the real power to make law is often 
offshore is the call in Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand for greater 
openness in treaty making and treaty acceptance.  That call has produced changes in all 
three countries, especially in respect of the process for the acceptance of treaties in the 
direction of a greater parliamentary role.60  But those changes cover only one part of the 
overall process, and extensive professional and public education remains necessary. 
The final lesson, or really question, concerns the allocation of law making power in 
these basic areas of human rights and criminal procedure.  Who should do what?61  The 
actors include the international community in its various forms, the people through formal 
constitutional processes, Parliament, public agencies (especially the police, for instance, in 
their general instructions), the courts and the scholarly communities.  While bills of rights 
are often seen as conferring new and, to some, inappropriate powers on courts, the process 
for the enactment of a bill of rights can mean that the legislature is itself prescribing those 
fundamental rules, sometimes for the first time.  (The legislative process may be an 
enhanced one, involving for instance extensive consultation and popular referenda.)  In 
  
60  For New Zealand see the Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee Inquiry into 
Parliament's Role in the International Treaty Process [1997] AJHR I 4A 8-9, New Zealand Law 
Commission The Treaty-Making Process (NZLC, Wellington, 1997), the Government response to the 
Committee Report [1998] AJHR A5 and the related debate and decisions of the House of 
Representatives, (28 May 1998) NZPD 9419-9443. 
61  For a valuable comparative consideration see Leslie Zines Constitutional Change in the 
Commonwealth (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991) ch 2.  In this paper I do not consider 
the consequences of the privatisation of much power that was previously public.  See for example  
Strange, above n 8. 
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that way and others, one principal purpose or effect of a Bill of Rights can be, and indeed 
should be, to reinforce democratic and responsible processes.   
Already, the brief New Zealand experience of its Bill of Rights provides rich material 
calling for further scholarly attention and rebutting, as would John Roberts, Alexander 
Pope's apparent cynicism in his Essay on Man: "For Forms of Government let fools contest; 
Whate'er is best administered is best".62 
 
62 An Essay on Man (1733-34), Epistle III;  “apparent” cynicism because Pope was looking for both 
better forms and better administration;  see for example William Warburton’s 1751 note in 
William K Wimsat (ed) Alexander Pope Selected Poetry and Prose (2 ed, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
New York, 1972) 219-220 n 15, quoting Pope : “no form … in itself can be sufficient to make a 
people happy, unless it be administered with integrity”. 
